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Abstract 
 
In this article we argue that the regulation of Intellectual Property (IP) protection should go beyond 
the traditional regulatory models and follow a more flexible regulatory framework. Considering the 
range of industrial needs and developments, the article develops a differentiated Community IP 
protection model that could stimulate growth and innovation, alter the behavior of patent users, and 
improve the quality of patents through spontaneous harmonization and convergence. To explain the 
model better, we distinguish two key elements: differentiated framework directives and epistemic 
patent communities. Differentiated framework directives dictate the establishment of general 
patentability standards at the EU level but allow national patent systems to set up stricter patent 
standards for particular subject matters at the national level. In this way, differentiated framework 
directives should lead to an appropriate balance between the principles of the IP protection regime 
and the ideals of economic integration. However, given the current diversity in innovation 
developments and industrial operations, we recognize the risk that not all IP stakeholders would 
agree to a differentiated Community IP protection model. To overcome the risk of deadlock within 
model negotiations, and to encourage the integration of countries that want to move forward and 
advance certain innovation developments, we propose the creation of epistemic patent communities. 
In this article, epistemic patent communities are perceived as strong mechanisms for establishing an 
inclusive patent protection environment that encourages various stakeholders to agree on certain 
patentability principles and to acquire better IP protection at the EU level.   
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1. Introduction 
 
The rationale for European intellectual property rights (IPRs) and particularly patents is that they 
should stimulate innovation among various stakeholders and contribute to its broad dissemination. 
The stimulation of growth and innovation relies on improving patentability standards and enhancing 
access to new inventions. As such, the establishment of an effective patent system is crucial. The 
effectiveness of an IP protection regime is determined by its ability to adapt to the needs of the 
knowledge-based economy1 , be equally accessible, and provide legal certainty (Pottelsberghe, 
2009). Europe has tried to find a basis for an effective patent system through the European and the 
Community patent systems. Whereas the European patent system was established by the European 
Patent Convention (EPC), and governed by the European Patent Office (EPO), to establish a 
centralized patent granting process; the Community patent system was initiated by the European 
Commission to foster the long-term goal of creating a unified IP protection regime as part of a move 
toward an undifferentiated, one-size-fits-all IP protection regime throughout the EU.  
 
Within the European patent system, the regulation of patentability issues has followed the traditional 
territorial principle in which national authorities are free to determine the scope and the interpretation 
of patents. Even though the European patent system has led to uniform patent granting conditions, 
the substantive terms of protection (the interpretation of the patentability standards and the 
enforcement of patents) fall under the authority of the national patent systems, which are similar but 
not identical across the EU (Piotraut, 2004; Ullrich, 2006). For an invention to be granted a patent it 
should be new at the time of patent filing (i.e. novel), involve an inventive step that is not obvious to 
a person skilled in the art (non-obviousness), and generate useful outcomes (industrial applicability) 
(Langinier and Moschini, 2002; Tödtling and Trippl, 2005). In addition to these standard 
requirements, patent examiners also have to determine the extent to which a particular subject matter 
is patentable. However, since National Patent Offices (NPOs) have failed to come to a mutual 
recognition and application of these concepts, the EPO’s Contracting States2 continue to apply 
divergent patentability rules that have resulted in patents of unequal values, dubious quality, and high 
levels of legal uncertainty.  
 
                                                 
1
 A knowledge-based economy is characterized by high degrees of industrial, socio-political, and national diversity. 
2
 Currently, the EPO has 36 Contracting States, including 27 EU Member States. 
 
 2 
Conversely, the proposed Community patent regulation emphasizes that the main purpose of the 
system is to contribute to realizing a single market and a common IP protection regime, with a 
unified patent throughout the Union that will be granted, regulated, and allowed to fall only in 
respect of the whole Union (Ullrich, 2002; 2006). Moreover, the Community patent system opts for a 
patent law that could be applied to any new technology. The IP protection principles behind this 
proposal have created many controversies within EU Member States (both industrialized and less 
developed countries). Since countries differ in their income levels, innovation preferences, and 
abilities to secure appropriate innovation and technological investments, it is difficult for them to 
agree on a unified approach to IP protection. They fear that such an approach might lead to a 
monolithic and centralized system that would discourage inputs from certain technology experts and 
industry leaders, and might be optimized only for some industries that would benefit the most.  
 
Recent industrial and technological developments (such as in the fields of biotechnology and 
computer software) have dramatically impacted on the growth of patent applications and on the 
debate over IPRs. This reflects the inability of the granting agencies and patent examiners to apply 
existing patentability standards to these innovative dynamics. While IP protection legislators provide 
the basic patentability standards that countries need to follow, they fail to adopt them to the new 
industrial needs. Recent developments in innovation highlight the fact that new patentability issues 
(e.g. scientific inventions) and actors (i.e. research institutions, universities) have entered the 
patentability area, and that these challenge the applicability of the existing standards. Since some 
inventions are the result of cumulative scientific work (e.g. the science-based, pharmaceutical-related 
inventions) they do not fit easily within the traditional patentability standards and regulatory 
frameworks that have been applied to other subjects. Science-based inventions are developing faster 
than Community legislation and show the need to improve both the governance and the regulatory 
framework of the existing IP protection regimes, while providing a more inclusive environment that 
recognizes the contributions of various stakeholders and experts.   
 
The regulatory framework and the governance of IPRs within Europe remain crucial to the 
innovation policy because they provide the basis as to whether a particular subject matter is 
patentable, and determine the boundaries (the products and the processes) in which patent holders 
can exercise their patent rights. Moreover, an understanding of the IP protection regulatory 
framework and governance provide incentives for patent examiners to adapt the IP regimes to the 
patenting trends in various fields and sectors. Political scientists approach the concept of regulatory 
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frameworks, and particularly the concept of governance, from different points of views: as a 
regulatory approach, an actor-based approach, or as an institutional approach (Borrás, 2003; 2006). 
These approaches coincide with the principles behind the traditional governance model according to 
which the regulatory policy frameworks are established by political communities that are constituted 
on the basis of specific political institutions at national or sub-national level, and governance is 
perceived as a concept of command and control by the state. This article goes beyond the traditional 
regulatory models and follows a more flexible understanding of IP protection regimes. We would 
argue that since patents reflect the existence of a system that operates at the public-private divide3, 
the regulatory framework of these IPRs needs to go beyond the formal rules of regulation, and focus 
on the effective inclusion of different systems, stakeholders, networks, and market interactions 
among the public and private sectors. Such an approach would lead to a hybrid regime that is 
collectively enacted within the society. 
 
As noted earlier, within the area of IPRs, the EU has continuously tried to establish a uniform regime 
built upon common regulations. However, the inability of the Community to achieve a collective 
agreement and understanding of IP protection principles has led the issue of the EU patentability 
regulatory framework to an impasse. As a result, many issues remain unresolved, such as: how new 
technological developments can be incorporated within the existing IP protection regulatory 
frameworks in Europe; to what extent should Contracting States be able to control the operations of 
the patent standards within their territories; how to establish an inclusive IP protection regime that 
would balance the tasks between the Contracting States and the EU. By focusing on the evolution of 
the regulatory framework for IPRs, and specifically on patents, this article examines these questions 
in detail, and proposes a more flexible, sector-specific patent regime that would build upon 
differentiated adjustment strategies. A regime that would stimulate both growth and innovation, 
while bringing together experts from various fields to clarify the mission of the IP protection regime 
and improve the quality of patents through natural harmonization and convergence. The article is 
organized as follows. The next section highlights the main factors that affect the ability of the 
European patent system to provide an appropriate basis for IP protection and innovation 
development. Section 3 explains the principles of the Community patent regime and discusses its 
potential consequences for IPRs. Section 4 elaborates on a differentiated Community IP protection 
                                                 
3
 Since patents are granted by state authorities, they become part of the public legal system, but the granted patents emphasize an 
industrial entitlement - a property right, and this has implications in civil law. However, patents are enforced by public 
jurisdiction through the courts. 
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model and on the impact that its components have on establishing an effective IP protection regime. 
The final section summarizes the findings and draws some conclusions.  
 
2. Re-considering the Role of the IP Protection at the European Level 
 
The initiatives toward the establishment of an IP protection regime at the European level were 
finalized in the Munich Convention of 1973. During the 1970s, the EPC established the EPO as an 
alternative4 through which countries could acquire IP protection (Piotraut, 2004). The political goal 
of this intergovernmental regime was to establish a uniform patent system but, in reality, it only 
managed to establish a centralized patent granting process, while the resulting process and the 
legislative authority for the use of patents remained under the national jurisdictions of the 
Contracting States. A single application to the EPO, after a standard examination procedure, results 
in patents being granted for whichever countries the applicant asks and pays for. The centralized 
granting procedure has facilitated the management of patent protection policies, but applicants are 
still required to pay national maintenance fees for all the territories to be covered, which results in 
high costs for the applicant (Harhoff and Reitzig, 2004). A patent granted by the EPO is typically 
validated for five or six countries. It is important to note that the granted rights do not represent a 
unitary European patent, but a bundle of national patents. The national jurisdictions retain the power 
to reject patent rights even when the EPO has granted the patent, and conversely national countries 
can uphold a patent application in their own territory even if the EPO has rejected it. In this way, the 
current institutional setting of the European patent system divides the market into areas where a 
patent is enforced and those in which it is not. This creates high levels of legal uncertainty and low-
quality patent granting system that could lead to segregation in the operation of the internal market 
(Wiebe, 2000), contrary to the provisions of Article 95 of the EC Treaty5. 
 
Nevertheless, despite the deficiencies within the European patent system, there has been an increase 
in the number of patent applications to the EPO reflecting the growing impact of this 
intergovernmental organization in the IP protection field. The number of patents filed within the EPO 
has grown from 82,261 in 1997 to 140,725 in 2007 (see Figure 1) and, significantly, half of these 
come from the IT and the biotechnology industries. When comparing the scale of the patents with 
those of a decade ago, it is clear that today’s patent applications are much broader and include more 
                                                 
4
 The European patent system is not exclusive; applicants can also obtain strictly national patents if they are only interested in 
obtaining patent protection in one or a few of the EPC Contracting States.  
5
 Article 95 of the EC Treaty provides for the adoption of the Community-wide rules that reduce barriers to trade and market 
entry among Member States, and improve the functioning of the single market.  
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claims6 with less specific content. Since the 1980s, the size of patent applications to the EPO has 
more than doubled (in the 1980s a patent typically included 10 claims, while the average is now 22 
claims) (Mejer and Pottelsberghe, 2009).  
 
Figure 1: The European patent applications of the EPO member states 1998-2007 
 
 
 
Source: The EPO Database. European patents and patent applications;  
Available at:  http://www.epo.org/about-us/office/statistics.html  
 
The increasing number of patent applications does to an extent reflect the success of the EPO, but it 
also implies that countries, or rather their leading market actors (large companies, SMEs, individual 
inventors, etc.), are much more involved in protecting their property. These patenting trends have 
been influenced by national economic capacities (GDP), national investments in knowledge, and 
national capabilities to adapt to the changing innovation environment (Cowan, Eijk, Lissoni, Lotz, 
Overwalle and Schovsbo, 2006; Tsipouri, Reid and Miedzinski, 2008). As illustrated in Figure 2, 
countries with higher GDPs and which invest more in knowledge (make higher inputs on innovation) 
are more likely to have larger innovation outputs and a relatively large number of patent applications.  
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 Patent claims emphasize the products or processes that the inventor aims to cover in the protection conferred by the patent. 
Usually the patentee aims to claim as much as possible in order to ensure a monopoly situation in the market. 
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Figure 2: European patent applications in the most prominent countries7 within Europe 
 
 
 
 
Source: The EPO annual reports. European patents and patent applications;  
Available at http://www.epo.org/about-us/office/statistics.html  
 
In addition, the striking growth in the number of patents over the last decade shows how innovation 
processes have become more competitive and dependent on the new high-tech firms, and on research 
institutions and networks, and how the access of new types of institutions8 in the patent arena (e.g. 
universities) has remarkably impacted on the development of new subject areas (such as science-
based, pharmaceutical-related inventions). Among the fastest growing technologies are ones within 
the electrical engineering and electronics (IT, telecommunications, audiovisuals), pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology fields, and medical engineering (see Figure 3). The rapid growth of these technologies 
reflects their high potential to modernize Europe’s industrial base and its share of the global high-
tech market. The EPO Database indicates that, by 2001, the market for software had reached €60 
billion, and in biotechnology it is expected that investments may exceed €2000 billion.  
 
                                                 
7 The EU Member States (and EPO Members) with the highest number of patent applications within Europe.  
8
 In the 1980s, only 0.5% of all applications came from academia, today the figure exceeds 4% and about 5000 applications are 
filed each year at the EPO.  
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Figure 3: The European patent application of the EPO member states per technical field 1990-2007 
 
 
 
 
Source: The EPO annual reports; and the Scientific Technology Options Assessment Report, 2006 9  
 
Recognition of the above mentioned patenting trends is of crucial importance because they question 
the ability of the European patent system to provide an appropriate regulatory framework that 
effectively responds to these new technological developments. The EPC provisions do not provide 
any guidance as to when an item can be considered an invention, although Article 52 (2) does include 
non-exhaustive list of what should not be considered an invention10 (Freedman, 2000; Kranakis, 
2007). This creates many dilemmas within countries and industries as to the patentability of new 
technologies (e.g. biotechnological products, computer software, integrated circuits, information 
                                                 
9
 See:  Cowan, Robin., Eijk, V. Wim., Lissoni, Francesco., Lotz, Peter., Overwalle, V. Geertrui  & Schovsbo, Jens. (2006). Policy 
options for the improvement of the European patent system. (STOA/FWC/2005-28). Brussels: Directorate General for Internal 
Policies;  and  http://www.epo.org/about-us/publications/general-information/facts-figures 
 
10Article 52 (2) of the EPC states : “ It is hereby declared that the following (among other things) are not inventions for the 
purposes of this Act, that is to say, anything which consists of : a) a discovery, scientific theory or mathematical method; b) a 
literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work or any other aesthetic creation whatsoever; c) scheme, rule or method for performing a 
mental act, playing a game or doing business, or a program for a computer; d) the presentation of information” 
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technology). Since patenting dynamics are mostly led by “science-based” or “complex” technologies, 
they challenge the European law and the applicability of current patent standards within the 
European patent system, and have created a need for EU legislation to contribute more to meeting the 
new industrial needs and to the mutual understanding of IP protection across countries.   
 
In line with Article 52 (1) of the EPC Treaty, the EPO grants patents for all types of products and 
processes provided they are non-obvious, novel, involve an inventive step, are susceptible to 
industrial applicability, and have a technical character (Borrás, 2003). These criteria set the basic 
patentability standards that countries are supposed to follow, but they have failed to adapt to the new 
technological developments that challenge the applicability of these standards. Moreover, since the 
EPC Article does not specify exactly what constitutes an invention, it leaves considerable leeway for 
the Contracting States to determine what is considered an invention, and this has created many 
disputes at national courts as to the correct interpretation of the EPC patent provisions (Heath, 2002; 
Begley, 2007). Several court cases (including Epilady v. Remington; Angiotech v. Conor) reflect that 
discrepancies in interpreting a common set of standards applied for granting a patent to an invention 
have led to an increase in legal uncertainty among countries, and to poor quality patents11.  
 
It is important to note that many of the new technological developments have made the approach of 
developing general patentability standards unworkable because some industries have advanced to the 
point where they can satisfy the established standards for being granted a patent, while still leading to 
later disputes. For example, today’s software programs are mostly an accumulation of existing 
programs, which might serve not only the purpose of immediate commercialization, but might also 
be used for future research. In this way, software developers use various pieces of existing programs 
to develop new software tools (Cohen and Lemley, 2001; Panagopoulos, 2003). While a new 
assemblage of software pieces might fail to meet the patentability standards due to a lack of novelty, 
it is difficult to determine the state of the art because such ‘inventions’ are not documented in journal 
articles or papers. As such, a new assemblage might pass the novelty test and, if the components are 
not recognized by the skilled programmers involved in its assessment, the new program might well 
pass the inventive-step test. Although, such a granted patent could be revoked, this would 
                                                 
11
 According to the European Patent Conference (EUPACO) in Brussels, a quality patent should:  a) involve a highly inventive 
step, b) be clearly written, and c) be carefully examined by the patent examiners during the examination stage. Patent examiners 
should be able to access the literature as well as various scientific publications (i.e. prior art) that are related to the invention. 
More information available at http://www.eupaco.org/eupaco2 
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undoubtedly take time, and involve large costs in obtaining expert advice and evidence and then in 
applying for a formal revocation.  
 
Recognizing the complex actions that companies or countries might take when ‘imitating’ computer 
and software inventions, large manufacturers (who are mostly behind such inventions) opt for strong 
patent regimes with lengthy broad patents (Frischtak, 1995). Moreover, to recoup their innovation 
costs, these manufacturers use their inventions as bargaining devices or as threats in cross-licensing 
or infringement cases, and aim to patent each sub-invention that has the potential to enter their 
complex systems (Borrás, 2003; Hall, 2007). This has led to an explosion of patent applications in 
electronics and other complex technologies, and to patent overlap, as well as to disputes between 
large companies and other social groups (such as SMEs). While large companies opt for a strong 
patent regime, the other groups argue that, since the generation of “essential patents” is easy but 
costly in this sector, software patenting might lead to an anti-competitive effect that might block the 
development of smaller enterprises. The controversies and disputes among these actors led to the 
failure of the proposed EU Software Directive which set out to regulate the protection of these 
inventions at the EU level and to determine the terms and the eligibility criteria for software patents.  
 
Alongside software inventions, the biotechnology sector is also worth examining since it shows the 
impact that various IP disputes have had in making this industry one of the few sectors in which EU 
legislation has managed to harmonize the protection of inventions at the EU level. Before the advent 
of biotechnology, the patenting of higher life forms was seen as unacceptable. Moreover, Article 53 (b) 
of the EPC specifically ruled out patentability of transgenic animal and plant varieties. The EPC 
Articles were disputed during the ‘Harvard mouse’12 (which concerned a transgenic mouse - a non-
human animal susceptible to cancer) and the PGS cases (which sought a patent on a transgenic plant 
invention) (Harhoff and Reitzig, 2004). In the first case, the EPO Board of Appeal granted a patent 
and accepted the invention on the basis of Article 53 (a) and (b), while the Board denied a patent in 
the second case on the basis of Article 53 (b) interpreting the PGS plant as an unpatentable “plant 
variety”. These decisions led to many disputes among the parties because the Board could not give 
any logical explanation for its application of the patentability standards and strategies (i.e. why in the 
                                                 
12
 Initially, the EPO Board of Appeal refused to patent this invention, excluding it as an “animal variety” on the basis of Article 
53 (b) although, when considering Article 53 (a), the EPO Board of Appeal was unable to determine whether this invention 
violated public policy. This decision was appealed, and the Board of Appeal then held that Article 53 (b) excluded “animal 
varieties” from patentability but not animals. As such, the EPO then granted its first patents for a transgenic non-human animal. 
Following this case, Plant Genetic Systems also sought a patent on a transgenic plant. The EPO granted the patent, but this was 
immediately opposed by Greenpeace. Following this opposition, the EPO re-examined this patent application and rejected it 
under Article 53 (b) as an “unpatentable” plant variety.      
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first case a patent for a transgenic ‘invention’ was granted and in the second case denied)13. 
Moreover, it emphasized the need for the EU legislation to intervene in democratizing the 
governance of patents and to expand the regulatory framework of IP protection from regulating only 
the “classical” biotechnological matters (e.g. food technology, microbial treatment of sewage water, 
etc.) to establishing appropriate regulatory frameworks for specific issues within the field (i.e. new 
plant and animal varieties). As a result, the European Commission adopted a Biotechnology 
Directive which provided sufficient legal protection for biotech inventions, while strengthening and 
harmonizing European patent law in this industry through a secondary EU law.  
 
In this way, the biotech industry is among the few sectors in which patents are regulated at the EU 
level and are validated in all 36 Contracting Countries. However, the issue of gene patents remains 
unclear within this industry. Generally, genes are considered to be part of our “common human 
heritage” and that patenting them would contravene public order and morality. However, since the 
EPC does not define the meaning of the public order, nor specify what types of subject matter 
contradict public morality, some countries have issued gene-related patents14, which are very broad 
in their nature and it is argued risk blocking further scientific progress (Freedman, 2000; Williamson, 
2001).   
 
Besides the lack of clarity on standards and requirements for the patentability of new subject matters, 
the lack of collaboration among the NPOs and the European patent examiners, plus the workloads 
associated with patent examinations, have contributed significantly to the inability of the system to 
accommodate the widening diversity in subject matters. In establishing a centralized patent-granting 
system, the national patent systems effectively acted as centrifugal forces in shaping the function of 
the EPO and consequently benefited from its provisions. However in the later years of its operation, 
the EPO has established examination procedures for multi-territorial patents and acquired all the 
competences related to registering and examining patent applications. This has reduced the impact of 
the NPOs, as registration and examination systems, and relegated them to purely domestic market 
offices mostly responsible for post-grant patent issues (Ullrich, 2006; Kranakis, 2007). All of this has 
created a gap in the collaboration among European patent examiners, NPOs, and national 
                                                 
13
 In general, these problems stem from the fact that within the EPC there is a lack of a clear definition of plant and animal 
varieties. For example, the term “animal varieties” is found in the English text, but the German text translates to “animal species” 
and the French to “animal breeding”. These terms describe distinctly different animal groupings and this creates enormous 
obstacles within the European biotechnology plant industry.  
14
 In 1983, France patented an isolated yeast. Patents have also been issued in respect to a gene sequence for a hepatitis B antigen, 
and for vitamin B12. 
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experts/stakeholders, and limits the opportunities for patent examiners to get thorough the 
information on an innovation’s novelty and state of the art, and to then conduct an effective patent 
examination and enforcement process. As a result, patent examiners end up granting low-quality 
patents (i.e. patents that would not have been approved had the examiner thoroughly considered the 
relevant prior art of the invention) or refusing valid applications.  
 
The above discussed issues within the European patent system and the parallel technological 
developments show that the actual IP protection regime has succeeded to some extent in providing a 
centralized patent-granting system but that it has failed to provide a regime that leads to an inclusive 
and effective IP protection environment. Acknowledging the deficiencies of the current IP protection 
regime, the European Commission has reintroduced the idea of a Community patent system. Since 
such a regime has been constantly proposed and rejected15, its proposed re-establishment raises many 
questions within the IP arena, including the crucial dilemma as to whether the proposed principles of 
this regime would provide a better way to protect and develop innovations in various fields.  
 
3. Assessing the Role of the Community Patent Regime 
 
As outlined in the previous section, the current IP protection system features the coexistence of 
national and European patenting systems. Adding the Community patent to these options could result 
in patents with a unitary character (valid in all EU Member States), which would be granted only in 
respect of the whole Union. As such, the system might lead to lower maintenance fees, better 
opportunities for an integrated European market, and lower translation costs (if an appropriate 
translation framework is established)16. The Community patent system is seen as an alternative patent 
protection route to the existing system, and countries would be free to choose between the European 
and the Community patent when the EPO was deciding whether to grant a patent (Ullrich, 2002; 
2006). Nevertheless, the Community patent regime has often been controversial in principle because, 
within this proposal, the EPC remains responsible for setting the conditions for granting the 
Community patent, and the EPO for receiving, examining, and deciding patent granting issues. 
Besides this, the Commission has proposed the establishment of a centralized Community Patent 
                                                 
15
 The EU has had the idea of a Community patent since 1975. However, disagreements among the Member States about the 
provisions of the Community Patent Convention (CPC) led to this proposal being frequently relaunched and never entirely 
accepted by the Contracting States. In 1997, the Commission passed a Green Paper on Innovation, in which the establishment of 
a Community patent was a priority. Following this initiative, in 2000, debates over a uniform IP protection regime captured the 
attention of many politicians and policymakers, but a common agreement has yet to be achieved (Heath, 2002). 
16
 The proposed Community patent required patent claims to be translated in their entirety into all languages of the Member 
States, which would obviously be extremely expensive and impractical in terms of efficient operation of the system.  
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Court with exclusive jurisdiction over validity and infringement matters but not, however, in matters 
concerning contractual or compulsory licenses (Begley, 2007). In this way, there would remain a 
split in jurisdictions: the Community Patent Court would have jurisdiction only for post-patent-
granting litigation matters, whereas litigation over the granting, limitations and revocation of 
Community patents would remain within the EPO’s jurisdiction.  
 
The disputes over the Community patent regime basically come down to its inability to provide 
flexible IP protection that accommodates the needs of diverse industries and concerns over the 
capacity of the Contracting States to adopt and transpose the Community IP protection principles to 
the national level. An initial concern is that the basic idea of the Community patent regime, to 
establish a unified patent system whose principles will be valid to all technologies with no need for 
technology or industrial specifications, risks the establishment of a monolithic centralized system 
which could only be changed if the “inner leaders” (aggregated from the entire business spectrum) 
indicated that a change was needed (OECD, 2006). The fear is that this could discourage inputs from 
technology experts and industry stakeholders because their perspectives would be limited to isolated 
vertical segments and not be of sufficient weight to invoke changes. The danger of the one-size-fits-
all regime is that it might end up being optimized only for those industries that potentially benefit the 
most, because they would put the most effort into the operation and evolution of the system. Taking 
into account the fact that the pharmaceutical and chemical industries are involved in the protection of 
drugs worth billions of dollars, it is natural that these industrial sectors will make a strong input in 
shaping IP protection principles. Therefore, a one-size-fits-all IP regime might end up biased toward 
the needs of these industries and, as a consequence, over- or under-protect other technological 
sectors, and fail to fully account for other factors that might be relevant for optimal levels of 
protection.  
 
As noted earlier, patenting trends have changed drastically, and the ability of an industry or a country 
to foster innovation and technology development now depends on many variables, each of which 
requires specific attention. Industries differ in the way they process innovations and in their 
application of patentability standards. Some innovations tend to be relatively isolated and others rely 
more on the continuous innovation process (Cohen and Lemley, 2001; Encaoua, Guellec and 
Martínez, 2006). For example, the pharmaceutical sector is characterized by a relatively self-
contained innovation process, one that generates a single finished product with few incentives for 
further improvement (i.e. once drugs are produced and tested, few initiatives are taken to improve 
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them). In such industries, the rate of new innovative ideas is usually low and the strong application of 
certain patentability standards (such as non-obviousness) might discourage innovation development 
because firms would have great difficulties in accessing the knowledge to which their competitors 
hold the patents. However, the situation may well be different in other industries (such as computer 
software and bio-informatics) where new innovative ideas are frequent and the application of certain 
patentability standards (i.e. novelty and non-obviousness) will need to be stronger. In this sort of 
industry, cumulative innovation is crucial because inventions cannot be developed without accessing 
the knowledge embedded in the previous generation of inventions. Therefore, patentability standards 
need to be strongly applied if one is to create incentives for R&D to innovate by ensuring higher 
turnovers for innovators (Langinier and Moschini, 2002; Tödtling and Trippl, 2005). These industrial 
differences are clearly inconsistent with the assumption that a uniform patent system will inevitably 
be superior.  
 
Another issue with the Community patent system is that this regime might create disputes between 
countries that have large differences in the structural IP protection in their systems. Unlike the 
European patent system, once a Draft Regulation on Community Patent is adopted, it will 
automatically be part of the acquis communautaire and will not be renegotiated or amended in 
respect of new members. This might lead to fierce opposition in countries where such a regime 
would require major changes in the structure and the core functions of the national innovation 
systems (NIS). Recalling the data shown in Figures 1, 2, and 3, we see that there are huge differences 
among national preferences and industrial evolutions, which implies that different factors impinge on 
the success of NIS. Four types of Contracting States are distinguished in terms of the innovation 
process: the innovation leaders17, the innovation followers18, the moderate innovators19, and the 
catching-up countries20 (Tsipouri, Reid and Miedzinski, 2008). Each group differs in its regulatory 
frameworks and social capacities, as well as in its abilities to secure appropriate financial investments 
in innovation. Among the important factors that challenge the ability of the policymakers across 
these countries to uniformly establish effective innovation systems within a reasonable period of time 
are capability, network, institutional and framework failures.  
 
The capability failures reflect the inabilities of countries or industries to perform successfully due to 
managerial deficiencies and inabilities to understand, learn, and absorb new technologies. The 
                                                 
17
 Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, United Kingdom, Sweden and Finland 
18
 France, the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, Ireland and Luxembourg 
19
 Italy, Norway, Portugal, Iceland, Greece, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia and Spain 
20
 Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia 
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institutional and the framework failures emphasize the institutional inadequacies and the 
shortcomings that countries have within their IPR regulatory frameworks, innovation governance, 
and health and safety rules (Arnold, 2004: 7). These problems occur most commonly in the catching-
up countries and the moderate countries that lack the administrative capacities to coordinate the use 
of knowledge, to provide incentive systems, and to follow the innovation routines of the more 
developed countries. Network failures occur due to the inability of actors within the innovation 
system to interact with and engage in knowledge generation and diffusion. Such failures are more 
common in the innovation leaders and the innovation followers that are usually locked-in to particular 
technological regimes or innovation systems, which prevent transition away from the traditional 
technologies and the complex interlocking systems (i.e. complex scientific knowledge, long-run 
cumulative development, complex engineering practices, and process technologies) (Smith, 2000). These 
failures reflect the complex challenges that policymakers face to ensure that the NIS perform as a 
whole. Therefore, it is hard to see how uniform one-size-fits-all regime would be superior in 
addressing the various needs and challenges. The above mentioned issues will present an obstacle if 
Contracting States try to rapidly change their national policy regimes and harmonize their national 
patent laws.  
 
For all these reasons, since neither the European nor the Community patent systems have managed to 
ensure an effective IP regime (which would require constitutional equality of IP protection) or an 
inclusive innovation environment at the European level (that would require the harmonization of 
national patent systems), the regulation of  IP protection remains in an impasse. Despite this 
somewhat gloomy story, this article aims to do more than elaborate only on the obstacles presented 
by the existing regimes. The object is to learn and move forward within the IP protection area by 
suggesting a more integrated and flexible patent regime. As such, in the next section, we propose 
establishing a differentiated Community IP protection model that builds on differentiated framework 
directives and epistemic patent communities to stimulate growth and innovation, to alter the behavior 
of patent users, and to improve the quality of patents through spontaneous harmonization and 
convergence.  
 
4.  A Case for a Flexible Intellectual Property Protection Model: The Differentiated Approach 
 
In the present debate on the Community regulatory framework, the assertion of a legitimate diversity 
is often misunderstood as a demand for limiting European competences or as a process that needs to 
refer to examples of political diversity in which the principle of “subsidiary” has played a crucial 
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role. However, with the present state of economic integration, competition, and innovation 
development, the aspirations for a Europe of Knowledge and Innovation cannot be realized through 
purely national solutions. What is needed is an IP protection regime that is both flexible and 
Europeanized, and that provides an appropriate balance between the principles of the IP protection 
regime and the ideals of economic integration. On the one hand, a Europeanized IP protection regime 
should ensure a horizontal relationship among the national patent systems and knowledge 
subsystems21, as such providing a legal counterweight to the supremacy of the internal market, the 
European competition law, and regional knowledge diffusion. However, on the other hand, a 
Europeanized IP protection regime should play a crucial role in vertical coordination between the 
national and the European policy hierarchies. As such, it must ensure constitutional equality at the 
Community level for IP protection, and create incentives for the individual EU Member States to 
adjust their IP regimes to the competitive pressures of the internal market and to knowledge 
development.  
 
Having considered the present situation within the IP protection arena, there is no doubt that a regime 
that ensures effective horizontal and vertical relationships is needed. However, the divergent 
patentability of the various subject matters and the normative aspirations of countries impact on the 
regulatory IP framework to such an extent that they defy the aspirations of uniform treatment in 
Community patent protection. Technological changes and innovation developments move faster than 
the Community legislator and the European patent legislature (Ullrich, 2006: 38), and imply a need 
for the system to ensure that national countries have a margin for experimental maneuver so that they 
can cope with local IP protection needs. Since the European and the Community patent systems have 
been unsuccessful in delivering such a regime, it is important to look at other options that might lead 
toward the goal of a differentiated and Europeanized IP protection regime.  
 
Politically, the easiest way would seem to be through an amendment to EPC Articles 52 and 53 that 
would extend the minimum standards for patentability to cover new subject matters and the 
modernization of IP protection systems. However, since these requirements would lead to policy 
changes that would have to be accepted by all Member States, they might create controversies (for 
example, the innovation leaders might not find the amendment proposals as beneficial as the 
catching-up countries, or vice versa) and might fail to provide much legal protection for the 
cumulative innovations that are constantly evolving, and are used in the R&D process to stimulate 
                                                 
21
 Knowledge subsystems usually comprise various national companies, consumers, suppliers, clients, and industrial cooperation 
partners. 
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further innovation (Langinier and Moschini, 2002: 12). Perhaps this situation could be avoided if the 
patentability authorizations were formulated more broadly, allowing directives to set up 
differentiated standards for regulating various patentable subject matters that take into account 
national innovation capacities, institutional developments, and economic abilities to pay at different 
stages of economic development in determining the level of IP protection.  
 
4.1. Differentiated Framework Directives and the Regulation of Various Patentable Subject Matters 
 
Within the course of European integration, the impact of directives has been dramatically increasing. 
Unlike regulations which become simultaneously binding on all Member States, directives give 
national governments discretion to determine the methods and forms employed to achieve the policy 
goals (Scharpf, 2002). As such, these legislative acts serve as a catalyst to encourage states to adopt a 
more integrated approach in establishing and implementing certain patentability principles or 
standards. The greatest advantage of these legislative acts in the IP protection area is that they do not 
apply to all Member States directly, but are binding only to the Member States to which they are 
addressed22. Therefore, they create opportunities for different groups of Member States to adopt 
substantively differing directives for different innovation subject-matters. However, since the 
national legislatures would always have to transpose these directives to their systems using different 
forms and methods, Member States will have an opportunity to adjust their patent systems through 
spontaneous harmonization. The regulation of patentability standards through directives has already 
occurred within the area of IPRs. For example, the Biotechnology Directive has managed to 
harmonize patentability standards in the biotechnology sector and has provided comprehensive 
access to legal protection for such inventions and to the market requirements (Wiebe, 2000). 
 
Initially, this Directive created many controversies among Member States, since they could not agree 
on the scope of patentable subject matters23. However, the rapid growth of the biotechnology 
industry induced the national legislatures and the courts to accept the protection of many 
biotechnological issues (i.e. for genetically engineered plants, animals, bacteria, and other life 
                                                 
22
 Article 189 - EC Treaty states that: “A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to 
which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods”  
23
 The European Parliament rejected the original proposed Directive in its first legislative process because of the ethical issues 
related to the patentability of living matter. However, after ten years of intense debates among EU government institutions and 
citizen groups, and many amendments and drafts, the European Parliament and the Council enacted a Directive on the legal 
protection of biotechnology inventions within the EU (98/44/EC). For more information see: Kranakis, Eda. (2007). Patents and 
Power: European Patent-System Integration in the Context of Globalization. Technology and Culture, 48 (4), 689-728; and  
 Begley, J.Kerry. (2007). Multinational Patent Enforcement: What the “Parochial” United States Can Learn from Past and Present 
European Initiatives. Cornell International Law Journal, 40, 522-570. 
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forms), and to finally adopt the Biotechnology Directive in 2007. It is important to note that even 
though the Contracting States accepted the Directive, disputes over the patentability of some subjects 
(e.g. human genes) remained, and some countries opted out on the patentability of certain matters 
(Cristoph, 2006). For example, Germany fulfilled the general requirements of the Biotechnology 
Directive by transposing most parts of it into its own legislative framework, but at the same time it 
enacted stricter national patentability standards for human genes24. This example emphasizes that the 
Biotechnology Directive has promoted some general patentability standards established at the EU 
level (which has led to considerable convergence among Member States in terms of patentable 
subject matters) while still allowing some national diversity. As such, it is a clear case of a 
differentiated framework directive.  
 
Following the example of the biotechnology industry, it is logical to assume that the establishment of 
differentiated framework directives would present added value and provide for a more effective 
patent regime. The framework directives would dictate the establishment of general patentability 
standards at the EU level but also allow national patent systems to set stricter standards for particular 
subject matters (i.e. for particular processes or products) based on the requirements of the local 
experts in the field. Such directives would enable the EU institutions to ensure that Member States 
are in line with the legislative requirements regarding patentability, and that the patentability 
provisions are not misused by countries to gain competitive advantages. In this way, the framework 
directives would lead toward structural convergence among the national systems in terms of 
patentability criteria and rules, the methodology used for assessing ‘an inventive step’, and the 
protection of new inventions. Moreover, when addressing sector-specific needs, the differentiated 
framework directives would enable national entities to set stricter standards for specific issues on top 
of the general EU level standards, and to align the degree of IP protection with the speed of 
technological development and the extent of market competition.  
 
However, even though such a differentiated Community IP protection model might be an effective 
solution within the area of IP protection, it should be emphasized that, with the present industrial 
diversity, the Contracting States and other national IP stakeholders might fail to agree to follow the 
model at a uniform pace. The diversity in terms of economic development, technological expertise, 
and political power has always prevented national countries following uniform rules and principles, 
even when facing common challenges (Emmanouilidis, 2007). To avoid the risk of further impasses 
                                                 
24
 See: Paragraph 1A  Sec. 4  of the German Patent Statute (PatG) 
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within the differentiated Community IP protection model, and to keep up with the dynamics of new 
technological developments (which see huge interdependences among cross-border innovations), it is 
important to investigate regulatory tactics that could co-opt experts from specific industries to shape 
and support knowledge generation and diffusion. Having seen that IP protection requires the 
collaboration of various stakeholders and experts, and embraces issues from various disciplines (such 
as law, economics, and technology), we argue that epistemic patent communities could be strong 
mechanisms for creating an inclusive patent-protecting environment that encourages the various IP 
actors to agree on certain principles that improve the quality of IPRs.  
 
4.2. Epistemic Patent Communities - Toward a More Inclusive and Effective Patent Regime 
 
Epistemic communities are considered to be groups constituted of various stakeholders and experts 
that have shared ways of knowing and patterns of reasoning. These groups work toward resolving 
policy projects by drawing on these shared beliefs, values and commitments to the production of 
knowledge. Epistemic communities differ from other groups in that they are knowledge-based 
communities consisting of experts from various disciplines with a strong ability to exert influence25 
and they very often act as soft bargaining instruments on behalf of Member States in reaching 
consensus on certain policy issues (Mani, 2006; Claes, Devroe and Keirsbilck, 2009). Epistemic 
communities have had pivotal roles in many fields, for example the Delors Committee26 with its 
impact on European Monetary Union (EMU). Influenced mainly by monetary experts and central 
bankers, this Committee is considered as the most successful epistemic community in terms of its 
contribution to establishing the fundamentals of the single internal market and drafting the EMU’s 
blueprint, which later formed the basis for the EMU articles within the Maastricht Treaty (Verdun, 
1999). Similar to this example, epistemic communities could be established within the field of IP 
protection and form authoritative communities of professionals that would serve as the main bridge 
between the Contracting States, the European Parliament, and the European Commission. These 
                                                 
25
 Alder and Haas (1992) imply that four stages are crucial for epistemic communities: policy innovation, diffusion, selection, 
and persistence. First, epistemic communities need to frame the problem and determine the complexity of the issue area, which 
guides them in defining the stage for national and transnational interests in particular problems, and the level at which the 
problems should be solved. Next, the epistemic communities determine the mechanisms and the transnational links that the 
community members will use to make their views known, and to influence the preferences of other national governments (policy 
diffusion). Once the goals are set and the policy supporters are determined, the epistemic communities select those policies that 
have the most importance at the national level and seek their legitimization. For more information see:  Adler, Emanuel & Peter 
M. Haas (1992). Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program. 
International Organization, 46 (1), 367-390. 
26
 Many national governments were against the dominance of the German Mark and of the Bundesbank in determining European 
Monetary policies, and thought that economic and monetary integration would benefit the European Community. Members of the 
Delors Committee shared the common beliefs that inflation was detrimental to growth and that stable exchange rates were 
necessary to ensure the proper operation of the Internal Market. 
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communities would assist the national and the EU institutions to overcome the many practical and 
technical barriers in various subject areas related to patentability. 
 
In general, there are no widely accepted standards or specific processes for the regulation of policies 
that tackle innovation and technological developments (Mani, 2006). In Europe, many countries 
organize discussions and debates among stakeholders over the various components of the innovation 
system. There are various established forums (e.g. the Standing Advisory Committee before the EPO 
(SACEPO), the EUROTAB, and the European Patent Judges Symposium) which include legal 
professionals and technical experts that pool expertise and produce new knowledge on technical and 
legal matters (Borrás, 2006:10). However, these forums have failed to represent the interests of a 
wider range of stakeholders, or to encourage the establishment of well-defined initiatives. There 
appears to be a lack of effective participatory channels that can generate deliberative processes to 
enhance stakeholders’ accountability.  
 
Within the IP protection area, there is a need for more effective and well-organized communities 
consisting of patent attorneys, research institutions, administrators, lawyers, regular users of the 
patent system (i.e. companies), and other experts that have a crucial role in the exploitation, 
regulation, administration, and enforcement of the patent system (Dutfield, 2003; Claes, Devroe and 
Keirsbilck, 2009). Communities built upon these components would lead to strong epistemic patent 
communities and provide national governments with a body of experts with facts and arguments, 
derived from their professional collective work and knowledge on innovation, which could assist in 
making policy choices. Further, by virtue of their technical and scientific expertise, the actors in the 
epistemic patent communities will own complementary assets that could generate pro-IP values and 
establish an integrated IP regime. Such a bold move was taken within the biotechnology sector, 
where epistemic communities succeeded in protecting biotechnology inventions and making the 
existing IP protection regime allow for some degree of interpretative openness.  
 
Even though the European Commission and the Council provide the impetus for an integrated patent 
regime, it is the establishment of epistemic patent communities that could enable effective outcomes. 
Unlike the above mentioned forums, these communities would provide incentives for the Contracting 
States and the European Parliament to get actively involved in discussions with well-informed 
stakeholders, would collect data that significantly inform decisions on the regulation of certain 
patentability subject matters, and would make useful proposals at the EU level. Epistemic patent 
communities would create an inclusive IP protection environment because various actors (both 
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national and regional, and including SMEs) will be encouraged to participate in policy dialogues that 
might move from draft proposals to regulations or, as Mani (2006: 3) puts it, from “green papers to 
white papers”. As such, the epistemic patent communities would weaken the divergent preferences of 
the Member States, encourage them to reach a consensus, support certain patentability standards, and 
establish a “small” patent community or union in which the granted patent will have a unitary 
character. Such an opportunity is included within the EPC provisions (particularly in Articles 14227-
149), which state that any group of Contracting States may join together and agree to accept granted 
European patents within their territories (Willems, 2002). Based on this, countries with similar IP 
protection interests can form a small patent community that would enable them to address these 
interests and establish the first steps toward an effective patent system. If the operations of this 
“small community” prove successful, this will attract other countries to join, and move toward 
creating a Community-wide patent protection regime. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This article highlights that the IP protection regulatory framework has, to a certain degree, been 
harmonized through the establishment of a centralized patent granting office that defines the general 
requirements for patentability at the European level, while leaving the implementation of IP 
standards to the national level. As a consequence, a fragmented patenting system has been initiated, 
in which the national patent systems are constrained by the supremacy of economic integration, the 
competition law, and the high levels of legal uncertainty. At the same time, the lack of an integrated 
European patent system and the failure of the long-term attempts to establish a Community patent 
regime have resulted in a failure to create an inclusive patenting environment, and this has hindered 
developments in technological and cumulative innovation activities. The current patent system is 
arguably in a state of crisis, having been challenged by the emergence of complex new technologies 
that build on cumulative innovation processes that have become the key factors in knowledge 
diffusion in many fields. Such complex ‘inventions’ (which are neither novel nor sufficiently 
inventive) have recently had a significant influence on the innovation and competition processes and 
have emphasized the need for EU legislation to move forward and adopt additional IP protection 
                                                 
27
 Unitary patents:  Article 142 (1) reads “Any group of Contracting States, which has provided by a special agreement that a 
European patent granted for those States has a unitary character throughout their territories, may provide that a European patent 
may only be granted jointly in respect of all those States”.  For more information see:  
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/kilde/nhd/hdk/2006/0004/ddd/pdfv/285976-11epc2000_engelsk_text.pdf 
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schemes that would coordinate the distinct national IP protection rules and create legal frameworks 
that would encourage developments and implementation in the new industrial and electronic markets.  
 
However, since neither the European nor the Community patent system has managed to deliver such 
a regime, the EU has moved toward establishing appropriate levels of sectoral IP protection through 
the application of the secondary EU law. These activities have successfully harmonized the 
patentability standards in certain sectors (especially in biotechnology), thereby emphasizing the 
impact that national IP stakeholders can have in tailoring the principles of the IP protection regime 
and in setting optimum levels of protection. Nevertheless, the EU activities to provide effective 
patentability frameworks in regards of new inventions have failed to fulfill the ambition of 
establishing an appropriate IP protection regime at the Community level. An appropriate IP 
protection regime is seen as one that would fulfill the requirements of the competitive innovation 
market and provide national and Community legislators with the opportunity to adopt the patent 
system to the needs of the market they control and to the industrial environment within which they 
operate.  
 
Given the challenges and barriers to IP protection, as well as the inabilities of the existing regimes, 
we argue that effective IP protection, that would deliver patent quality and flexibility, could be 
achieved through the differentiated Community IP protection model. A model that combines 
framework differentiated directives with the activities of epistemic patent communities to provide a 
flexible solution that will have the character of the European law (in order to ensure a constitutional 
balance between the national patent systems and the rules of European economic integration) and 
will accommodate the existing diversity in innovation while coordinating the interactions of various 
stakeholders within the field. The application of this model would encourage the integration-minded 
industries and countries to move forward and advance certain developments in innovation. Moreover, 
this model might serve as a basis for the design of more-differentiated approaches that could be 
followed by several sectors (such as European social and welfare policies, defense, and healthcare) to 
regulate their policy issues at the Community level while overcoming the difficulties of 
simultaneously providing  constitutional parity and preserving national diversity. 
 
Overall, the differentiated Community IP protection model offers an effective alternative in the field of 
protecting IPRs, but much remains to be done. To ensure that the proposed model as outlined above is 
formulated and implemented successfully, policymakers will require detailed knowledge on the 
applicability of the Community IP protection model compared to the existing bilateral agreements 
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that some companies have started to employ (patent pooling, cross-licensing, etc). Even though these 
latter agreements are not regulated at the EU level, they do represent a differentiated form of 
collaboration that countries use to protect their inventions and to prevent litigation while 
acknowledging the patentability principles of other parties. As such, these agreements might be 
important factors that should be considered in any future research and when conducting further 
empirical analysis on IP protection issues.  
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